No party is expected to win a majority in the May 7 general election, and coalition outcomes are uncertain and potentially divisive
May 6, 2015
By Jonathan Eyal,
BRITAIN'S general election campaign is concluding this week with the centuries-old traditions: MPs racing about their constituencies, politicians trading barbs and people displaying their party-coloured rosettes.
And yet, an air of revolution is in the air. Everyone knows that the May 7 ballots will produce an inconclusive result, with neither the ruling Conservatives nor Labour, their main opponents, gaining an overall parliamentary majority. And every politician is equally aware that the real ballot is not about who should rule the country for the next five years but about the future unity of the British state. Seldom before has an election been so critical and its results so elusive.
The British electoral system, which operates with various modifications throughout the former British empire, including Singapore and the United States, is famous for its ruthless pursuit of a decisive outcome which magnifies the advantage of only two competing parties, makes it almost impossible for newcomers to challenge the existing order, and delivers total power to a single winner.
The result is never "fair" in a mathematical sense: A fringe party can get up to 15 per cent of the total votes cast and still have no parliamentary seats, because what matters is capturing constituencies rather than just votes.
Still, it makes for solid government and smooth transfer of power. Typically, the final tally of the elections is known just a few hours after the ballots close. By 10am the following day, the leader of the winning party is invited to Buckingham Palace and, once the British Queen's hands are kissed, he or she has total power: Lady Margaret Thatcher stunned the nation by announcing a total overhaul of Britain's tax system within hours of her party winning the 1979 elections.
Still, the nation which invented this system doesn't seem to benefit from it any more. No party gained an overall majority in the 2010 British general election, and none appears poised to do so this week; one has to go back to the early 19th century for another example of two consecutive British elections failing to produce a decisive result.
One explanation for this outcome is that Britain is affected by a broader European trend of declining loyalties for any political party. Just a generation ago, it was enough to know where a person lived in Britain, what school he went to and what newspaper he read in order to predict which party he voted for. Loyalty to parties was tribal and entrenched, often for life.
The old national parties can no longer act as an umbrella for a broad coalition of supporters, since people are attracted to fringe or single-issue movements.
The UK Independence Party is a classic example: Its sole purpose is to pull Britain out of the European Union regardless of the economic consequences, but at one point during the current electoral campaign an astonishing one-fifth of Britain's electorate toyed with the idea of voting for it.
While 90 per cent of Britons regularly used to vote for either Labour or the Conservatives, only 66 per cent are predicted to do so this week.
Technology also allows newcomers to compete with large parties: The Liberal Democrats, who had languished on the sidelines of British politics since the 1920s, polled strongly in the last elections largely because Mr Nick Clegg, their photogenic leader, came across well in TV debates.
But there is a more specific British reason for this electoral drift: the rise of regional separatism, in the shape of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which aims to gain for Scotland independence from the United Kingdom. According to the latest opinion polls, the SNP now seems certain to get up to 45 out of Scotland's 59 parliamentary seats, all at the expense of Labour, which used to treat Scotland as its political fiefdom.
At first glance, this seems strange: After all, the SNP was given its chance of a referendum on Scottish independence only last September, and that option was decisively rejected by the electorate. But on closer inspection, the Scots' love affair with the SNP is understandable since, far from weakening it, the independence referendum actually strengthened the separatist party.
The negative campaign by Labour and the Conservatives against Scottish independence worked but alienated the Scots and persuaded them that, if they do have to stay in the UK, at least they would make sure the SNP is powerful enough to extract maximum advantages for Scotland from politicians in London.
The chances are, therefore, high that the rise in the SNP's power is not just a passing phenomenon but a permanent feature. In this sense, Scotland could end up paralysing Britain in the same way that Ireland paralysed British politics during much of the 19th century, for exactly the same reasons. And as long as the Scots hold so many parliamentary seats to ransom, future British elections will remain inconclusive. More importantly, even if a coalition is cobbled together after this week's ballots, the new government will have to deal with a novel problem in Britain: that of a perceived lack of democratic legitimacy.
According to current opinion polls, the Conservatives are on course to win the largest number of seats in Parliament but fall short of an overall majority. Any coalition government they form will be rejected in Scotland as illegitimate: The SNP will argue that, as long as Scotland remains in the UK, it will never have the party it wants in power.
But if Labour creates an informal coalition with the SNP and forms the next British government, this government will also be dismissed as illegitimate by people elsewhere in the UK, partly because it will be led by the party which didn't top the elections, and also because Labour would be seen as a puppet of Scottish separatists.
Given such awful choices, some politicians in London are already touting the idea of fresh elections as early as October this year. Yet there is no indication voters would change their views in such a short period. Instead, risking another inconclusive electoral result could deal a mortal blow to the existing political system.
The bitter truth is that both Labour and the Conservatives have been guilty of ignoring Scotland for decades, and now they have to regain the confidence of the Scots. Britain's two political parties also have to re-learn how to engage with the electorate, not once in a lifetime, but at every election, and how to build new electoral voter bases.
Until that happens, Britain's electoral results will continue to reflect the nation's real mood: one of indecisiveness about the country's identity, coupled with disdain for the current generation of second-rate politicians.
[After the Elections.]
May 11, 2015
EYE ON THE WORLD
What British election results say about voters
Current opinion-polling methods are out, along with class hatred. People want help to succeed.
By Jonathan Eyal Europe Correspondent In London
POLITICS is a brutish, cruel business. Exactly a week ago, Mr Ed Miliband, the leader of Britain's opposition Labour Party, was hailed as a providential figure: He was anointed as the next British prime minister, a proud scion of a famous left-wing family.
Today, he commands nothing apart from mocking newspaper editorials, and his Labour Party lies vanquished and rudderless. Meanwhile, Prime Minister David Cameron - the man who only a few days ago political observers in London dismissed as having "just 5 per cent chance" of retaining power - was triumphantly re-elected, and can not only expect to run Britain until the end of this decade, but is also likely to become the second longest-serving Conservative prime minister since the 19th century.
What happened in Britain offers some important lessons which leaders worldwide would be well-advised to study.
THE most striking feature about Britain's latest voting is that every single opinion-polling agency got its predictions disastrously wrong. Pollsters unanimously declared that neither the ruling Conservatives nor their chief Labour opponents would get a majority, only to discover when the ballots were counted that the Conservatives won, exceeding most predictions by a whopping 50 parliamentary seats.
Desperate to defend their reputations, pollsters offered a variety of justifications for their failures, ranging from the smug to the ridiculous. The Ipsos MORI polling giant continues to claim that its predictions were "within the margins of error for all the parties except for Labour whom we over-estimated", which is a nicer way of saying that the projections were correct, apart from the supposedly small matter of actually identifying the winner and loser.
Other pollsters tried to explain their failure by blaming Britain's "shy voters", the group of people who, allegedly, secretly vote Conservative but do not want to admit this in public, for fear that they will not be considered "cool". But the phenomenon has been known for decades, and polling agencies have claimed long ago that they "regularly compensate" for such "anomalies".
And then came the usual, self-serving argument of pollsters caught with wrong predictions: A supposed "last-minute surge" in the number of people voting for the Conservatives. The snag with this explanation is that there is no evidence of such a surge, and that opinion polls conducted hours before ballot stations opened in Britain last Thursday indicated no shift in sentiment.
So, what accounted for the pollsters' failure? First, it is obvious that the old techniques of collecting data are no longer working. In Britain, there was a substantial difference between polls conducted online, with people answering questions through their computers, and people being canvassed through their mobile phones. Those who answered questions by phone tended to favour the Conservatives, while those answering online opted far more for Labour.
Yet the overwhelming majority of polling firms ignored this significant discrepancy and continued to rely just on Internet surveys. The reasons? Costs and convenience. Internet surveys are dirt-cheap to conduct, but telephone surveys are not, largely because most people no longer use their landlines, so they need to be contacted through their mobile phones. However, obtaining random mobile numbers is sometimes illegal and always labour-intensive. And contacting people on their mobile phones is even more expensive: In the US, legislators allow the use of automated software to contact landlines, but demand the manual dialling of every mobile phone number.
The result is that polling agencies may be relying on flawed data supplied online by people who enjoy giving their views on any topic, the sort of people who may appear to be representative of society at large in terms of age, gender and profession, but are actually not so in every other way.
It is striking that the failure to predict the results in Britain comes only a few months after pollsters confidently predicted that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in deep trouble, only to see him pulling off a sweeping electoral victory.
Pollsters also failed to gauge the level of support for President Barack Obama when he faced re-election in 2012. In short, the failure in Britain is part of a pattern which indicates systemic polling problems.
Opinion polls also under-estimated the scale of the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP), a movement pledged to win Scotland's independence from the rest of Britain. The SNP wiped out Labour's presence in Scotland: As one British commentator cruelly put it, there are now more panda bears in the zoo in the Scottish capital of Edinburgh than there are Labour MPs in Scotland.
Shying from the truth
BUT another reason for the pollsters' failure is that they made the wrong ideological assumptions about British voters. They assumed that rising support for the UK Independence Party (Ukip), a nationalist movement which wants to pull Britain out of the European Union and restrict immigration, would come largely at the expense of the Conservatives.
It did not.
The bulk of Ukip's votes came from the less-educated, poor members of the working class, people who usually vote Labour.
They are the ones who feel threatened by immigration and who are attracted to a nationalist campaign. If pollsters were less obsessed with treating every nationalist movement as "right-wing" they could have realised that a movement such as Ukip is actually a left-wing one in social terms, and one which hurts Labour.
Being ideologically blinkered translates into blindness to facts. The real problem may not be that of "shy voters", but of shy pollsters, who do not account for realities they do not like.
The moral of the story? That politicians should not treat opinion polls as either science or gospel, and certainly not as a substitute for the hard job of governing.
Leaders should follow their own convictions and offer the electorate what they think is right and workable, rather than what plays well with opinion polls, which may turn out to be wrong.
Another interesting conclusion from Britain's surprise electoral result which applies worldwide is about the aspirations of today's electorates.
Mr Miliband was persuaded by arguments that after years of economic austerity, "a mood of rising left-wing populism" was again becoming important. The success of economists such as Mr Thomas Piketty, who recently authored a best-selling book highlighting rising inequality in the Western world, also persuaded Mr Miliband to campaign on a left-wing agenda.
However, this flopped badly, for electorates are less stupid than their politicians assume.
British voters did not like the five years of austerity which they experienced, but opted for five more years of the same, largely because they did not find Mr Miliband's alternative of more spending and more taxes very convincing.
The old politics of class-hate, of telling voters that their salvation lies in taxing the rich in order to supposedly help the poor do not work: People want to be helped up the ladder of success, rather than see those who are successful knocked down.
Instead of outlining plans for big construction projects to reduce the severe housing shortage in Britain, Mr Miliband pledged his Labour Party to the imposition of a so-called "mansion house tax", a special duty on people owning expensive homes.
And instead of offering tax relief to young couples trying to establish families, he promised to increase taxes on the rich. Labour talked about the top and the bottom parts of society, but had nothing to say to those in the middle - the majority of the voters.
Labour ultimately lost the elections not because it was kicked out of Scotland, but because it was rejected in England, where the bulk of the voters are.
Working electoral system
AND the much-maligned British electoral system - one inherited by every former British colony including Singapore - worked precisely as intended. Sure, it was unfair, in the purely mathematical sense: The nationalist Ukip polled 3.8 million votes, but secured only one parliamentary seat, while Scotland's SNP polled 1.4 million votes, and got 56 seats.
Yet that is exactly the purpose of the British voting system: In order to maintain political stability, it depresses the importance of newly established challengers such as Ukip, but magnifies the strength of any movement which has strong regional roots, such as the SNP. The results may be skewed, but they strike a right balance between regional nationalism in Scotland which requires immediate treatment, and broad anti-foreigner sentiment, which will not be allowed to upset the operation of a parliamentary system.
None of this means that political life will be plain sailing for PM Cameron. He has no better than even chances of keeping Scotland as part of Britain. And he has to deal with anti-European backbenchers.
Still, his victory signified a return to more traditional politics of common sense and common values, of less public relations and opinion polls, and more understated substance.
Conservative perhaps, yet with a small "c".