What you need to know about South China Sea disputes

24 Feb 2016


The South China Sea, dotted with small islands, reefs and shoals, is one of the most hotly contested areas in the world.

While unexplored, much of the disputed area around the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands is believed to be potentially rich in oil and other natural resources. The sea is also a major shipping route through which over US$5 trillion (S$7 trillion) of maritime trade passes each year.

Here's a quick look at the disputes: 

Who claims what?
China: It claims almost all of the resource-rich waters in the South China Sea - an area defined by its "nine-dash line" which extends hundreds of kilometres south from China's Hainan Island to waters off the coast of Borneo, taking in some of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation. In 1947, it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory.

China's dilemma: Populists could hijack policy response

China and South China Sea

Jiang Zongqiang and Hu Xin For The Straits Times

3 Dec 2015

US assertiveness in disputed region has stoked nationalism in China and risks increasingly aggressive responses by Beijing

[A summary of the issues in the South China Sea. China has made vague claims and have left the exact nature of their claims ambiguous to allow them flexibility in their response. However, the popular opinion of the people is jingoistic and wants China to make them proud... apparently by taking military action and possibly precipitating a war. And that is why government should not be left in the hands of the people. Strangely, Communist, centrally-planned China seems as vulnerable to populism as democratic USA.] 

At the Halifax International Security Forum on Nov 21, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the United States Pacific Command, confirmed that "the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows and that the South China Sea is not, and will not be, an exception".

However, such actions can make it seem that the US is intent on demonstrating its predominance in the South China Sea. As such, there is no denying that these activities have worked to undermine China-US military trust and aggravate regional tensions by disregarding Chinese concerns on sovereignty and security interests in the area.

It has also stirred up a wave of populism among Chinese policymakers, scholars and netizens.

U.S. Navy's challenge in South China Sea? Sheer number of Chinese ships

OCTOBER 30, 2015


HONG KONG - When a U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed near one of Beijing's artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea this week, it was operating in a maritime domain bristling with Chinese ships.

While the U.S. Navy is expected to keep its technological edge in Asia for decades, China's potential trump card is sheer weight of numbers, with dozens of naval and coastguard vessels routinely deployed in the South China Sea.

Asian and U.S. naval officers say encounters with Chinese vessels, once relatively rare, are now frequent, even at the outer edges of the controversial nine-dash line Beijing uses to stake its claim to 90 percent of the waterway.

Such encounters will only increase after U.S. officials said the U.S. Navy would conduct regular freedom-of-navigation operations akin to the patrol by the USS Lassen, which penetrated the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit of Subi Reef in the Spratly archipelago on Tuesday.

"They are everywhere ... and are always very keen to let you know they are there," said one U.S. naval officer in Asia, requesting anonymity, referring to the Chinese Navy and coastguard.

"If you're in the South China Sea, you can expect to be shadowed."

In an actual conflict, the U.S. technological advantage could be crucial, but China's numerical superiority had to be taken into account, particularly in any stand-off at sea, security experts said.

The Western myth of universality and China's moment in history

Jan 09, 2015

This is an excerpt of a keynote speech by veteran diplomat Bilahari Kausikan at the Regional Outlook Forum yesterday organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Iseas). He explains that the Western claim of universality of certain political forms and values, which has been used to justify military interventions to change regimes, has aroused anxieties in countries including China.


China's rise has been psychologically disquieting to many in America and the West generally, because in China, capitalism flourishes without liberal democracy. This is regarded as somehow unnatural and illegitimate because it punctures the Western myth of the universality of certain political values and of the inevitability of the development of certain political forms. And unlike, say, Japan or India, China only wants to be China and not an honorary member of the West.

The myth of universality is ahistorical, pretentious and parochial.

In showing off its new toys, China isn't playing nice

December 18, 2014
YU NAKAMURA, Nikkei staff writer


GUANGZHOU, China -- China may have seen economic growth slow in November, but on the whole, it wasn't such a bad month for Beijing, as it enjoyed success in other areas.

"We should vigorously promote the Asia-Pacific free trade zone, setting the goal, direction and road map, and turn the vision into reality as soon as possible," Chinese President Xi Jinping said at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing on Nov. 11.

Xi called on the leaders of member states, including U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin, to work toward unity and harmony in the region. At the summit, held in the suburban Yanqi Lake area, China presented itself to the world as a powerful country. For his part, Xi acted as the amicable host, greeting guests with a handshake as they arrived at the welcoming ceremony.

Law and realpolitik in the South China Sea

EDITORIAL

DEC 23, 2014

CHINA'S rejection of the international process represented by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is both a missed opportunity and a disappointing corollary to its intransigence on the South China Sea dispute. Beijing's visceral opposition to third-party arbitration is based on the suspicion that the process is a means of exerting political pressure on it over territory it thinks is inherently Chinese. Thus, its recent position paper dismisses the special arbitral tribunal - where the Philippines filed a memorial this year - as having no jurisdiction over the issue. Instead, it asserts the "historical rights" that give Beijing indisputable sovereignty over disputed features.

The dynamics of size and the burden of history

Oct 01, 2014

By Bilahari Kausikan


CHINA and South-east Asia are geographically contiguous. We have no choice but to live together. China and Asean have decided their relationship should be a "strategic partnership", the 10th anniversary of which was celebrated last year.

Today, Asean-China relations are indisputably one of the most crucial relationships in East Asia and an important pillar of regional stability and development. And yet, there remains an undercurrent of reserve.

The various maritime disputes in the South China Sea have received much attention, but they are not the central issue. They are symptoms of a far more fundamental issue that colours the entire Asean-China agenda: the sheer disparity of size between Asean and China and hence the fundamental asymmetry of the relationship between them.

The combined population of the 10 Asean member states is less than half of China's population; China's gross domestic product is almost four times larger than the combined GDP of the 10 Asean member states.

This asymmetry of size and thus of power is an empirical fact that cannot be wished away. Big countries are always going to provoke a degree of anxiety in smaller countries on their periphery. This has nothing to do with the intentions of the big country; it is a reality faced by all big countries in every region throughout history. Big countries have a duty to reassure, a duty that China has only partially fulfilled. Small countries look at the world very differently from big countries.

Asia arms up to counter growing Chinese might

11 Sept 2014

TODAY

BEIJING — Vietnam has nearly doubled its military spending, Japan is requesting its biggest-ever defence budget and the Philippines is rushing to piece together a viable navy.

Several Asian nations are arming up, their wary eyes fixed squarely on one country: A resurgent China that’s boldly asserting its territorial claims all along the East Asian coast.

A less hospitable world without US engagement: PM

JULY 2

In a wide-ranging interview with Politico Magazine during his visit to the United States last week, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong spoke about Sino-US ties, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and America’s role in keeping the international world order. Below is an excerpt of the interview

A new cold war?

JUN 11, 2014

BY BARRY DESKER FOR THE STRAITS TIMES

THE annual Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore at the end of May saw sharp exchanges pitting delegates from the United States and Japan against those from China over the rival claims of Japan and China in the East China Sea.

Vietnamese, Philippine and American participants also criticised China's extensive claims in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, European representatives clashed with Russian delegates on the impact of Russia's annexation of Crimea and Moscow's support for breakaway groups in eastern Ukraine.

The mood was confrontational, especially in smaller informal discussions. The atmosphere reminded me of debates on regional and global issues in the early 1980s, when I served as a Singapore diplomat at the United Nations. The rhetoric was that of the Cold War and raised the question whether the world was headed for a new cold war, or even the outbreak of hostilities.

A China power play in choppy waters

Jun 09, 2014


An unpredictable US response to Beijing's new-found assertiveness could help calm tensions in the South China Sea.

By Jonathan Eyal, Europe Correspondent


A PASSING phase or a dangerous and permanent strategic challenge to Asian stability for years to come? That, in a nutshell, is the debate about China's current behaviour in the South China Sea, which appears almost deliberately designed to provoke most of the region's nations.

But even if no categorical answer can be provided to this question, it is clear that China has crossed a fundamental psychological barrier.

Beijing is no longer engaged in just a reactive or theoretical assertion of its rights to territories and waters; China now sets the strategic agenda with pre-emptive actions which create irreversible facts on the ground.

And China will continue doing so unless the United States and its allies - both in Asia and elsewhere - respond in a more coherent manner.

When the then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton was privately told in 2010 by senior Chinese officials that they considered Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea as China's "core interest", she instantly understood the huge significance of these words; that's why, notwithstanding China's fury, Washington promptly leaked details of the episode to the media, in the hope that this would either force Beijing to clarify its demands, or shut up.

Can Asia outwit Sun Tzu's strategy?

Jun 04, 2014

The United States, Japan and China are going eyeball to eyeball at sea, in the air and at the conference table.

By Narushige Michishita, For The Straits Times

ON MAY 30, top defence officials in the Asia-Pacific region gathered in Singapore to participate in the three-day annual Shangri-La security dialogue.

On the first day, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said "Japan will spare no effort to make regional stability, peace, and prosperity into something rock solid", and pledged his commitment to the security of the countries in the region.

On the next day, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that the US had more peacetime military engagement in the Asia-Pacific than ever before, and declared that US rebalance towards Asia was "not a goal, not a promise, or a vision" but "a reality".

In the face of concerted pressure, Chinese Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, who led the Chinese delegation, was on the defensive. He accused Japan and the US of provocation and intimidation, and said they had coordinated their attacks.

What solution to China-Japan maritime dispute?

May 09, 2014


Neither Beijing nor Tokyo has a clear claim to the disputed islands in the East China Sea

By Andy Ho, Senior Writer


US President Barack Obama recently declared that a 1960 defence treaty obligates his country to defend Japan if disputed islands in the East China Sea are attacked.

Called Diaoyu in Chinese or Senkaku in Japanese, the islands are "under Japan's administration", Mr Obama noted. It is their ownership that China, the potential attacker, disputes. Making up a total of under 7 sq km in area, the five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks lie slightly on Japan's side of the median in the East China Sea, about 120 nautical miles east of Fuzhou, China, 90 nautical miles north-east of Taiwan and 90 nautical miles from the Japanese Ryukyu islands.

Their value lies below, in "the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly comparing favourably with the Persian Gulf area", according to a 1968 US Naval Oceanographic Office study. This study sparked the dispute, as whoever owns the islands owns the oil and gas.

China asserts right to drill in disputed sea as stand-off mounts

TODAY

May 9


BEIJING — China insisted yesterday it had every right to drill for oil off Vietnam’s coast and warned its neighbour to immediately leave the area around the deep-sea rig where Chinese and Vietnamese ships are engaged in a tense stand-off.

With the ships jostling each other since China deployed the rig last weekend in disputed South China Sea waters, the United States warned both sides to de-escalate tensions and urged China to clarify its claims to the territory.

The stalemate underlines the apparently intractable nature of many of China’s territorial disputes with its neighbours. The ship stand-off — with both sides accusing the other of ramming ships — has raised the possibility of a conflict in the South China Sea’s most serious incident in years.

Maritime disputes call for S-E Asia input

Apr 30, 2014

By John Lee, For The Straits Times


PRESIDENT Barack Obama's visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines is confirmation that America-led bilateral security relationships remain the backbone of peace and stability in the region. Even so, the greater military power and economic weight of countries such as Japan might tempt weaker South-east Asian capitals to stay on the sidelines when it comes to tensions in the East China Sea and adopt a less direct and confrontational approach to keeping Chinese behaviour in check in the South China Sea.

That would be a mistake. Essential to Beijing's "divide and rule" strategy is to convince states that its interests in the East China Sea are unrelated to those in the South China Sea, and vice versa. In reality, South-east Asian states should realise that as far as China is concerned, the latter's maritime claims are indivisible. Known for the creative multilateral diplomacy that only smaller states tend to pursue, it is time that key players within Asean push for a Code of Conduct that prohibits the use of force to settle territorial disputes to cover all maritime regions in the Asia-Pacific, not just the South China Sea.

Obama reassures allies, but doubts over ‘pivot’ to Asia persist

TODAY

APRIL 30, 2014

MANILA — From the elaborate details of a Japanese state visit to the more mundane question of how much face-time to give each of his Asian hosts, United States President Barack Obama’s aides spent months meticulously scripting his four-country tour of the region.

But, as the week-long trip wrapped up yesterday, it was clear that, while Mr Obama scored points with sceptical allies simply by showing up, not everything followed the White House plan.

Asean grapples with rise of China

Apr 25, 2014

CHINA-U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

American President Barack Obama's Asia trip will be closely watched by the region to offer insights on how the US will respond to a rising China. Three writers give their perspectives from South-east Asia, China and Japan.

By William Choong, For The Straits Times


AFTER their first meeting in Slovenia in 2001, then United States president George W. Bush said he had looked Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in the eye and was "able to get a sense of his soul".

Fast-forward 13 years, and Mr Barack Obama has seen Mr Putin's soul - and much more. In the past weeks, military forces loyal to Russia have overtaken Crimea in southern Ukraine and sparked the biggest confrontation between Russia and the West since the cessation of the Cold War two decades ago.

Russia's actions in Crimea surprised the Americans and Europeans. For years, the Europeans thought a more democratic and free-market-oriented Russia would integrate into the global community and, as a result, develop a modern allergy to the use of force.

The events unfolding in Ukraine might be far removed from Asia, but their implications bear directly on Asia and Asean in particular, given that the latter is in the driver's seat in building a slew of institutions to foster regional order and manage China's emergence.

Like the European approach to Russia, South-east Asians believe China can be "socialised" into regional institutions such as the Asean Regional Forum and the Asean Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). By weaving China into an interlocked web of shared norms, China can be convinced to preclude the use of force in its interactions with its smaller neighbours.

Like the Europeans on Russia, South-east Asians believe China would be unlikely to come to blows with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. After all, the two countries' economies are highly interdependent, and any conflict would entail dramatic losses in economic welfare and regional stability.

Like Russia, however, China has not and will not shy away from the use of force. It has been two years since Chinese paramilitary forces locked out the Philippines from the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

Last month, Chinese Coast Guard vessels blocked two Philippine ships attempting to resupply marines on Second Thomas Shoal.

The number of incursions into the Senkakus - as the islands are known in Japan - by Chinese government ships has also gone up. Last week, China seized the Baosteel Emotion, a Japanese-owned cargo ship, in a dispute with China over pre-war debt.

All this begs the question: Given that China, like Russia, is building its "China dream" on a narrative of recovery from its much-vaunted "century of humiliation" at the hands of Western powers, what can Asean do in the face of further displays or use of force by China?

The answer: Not much really. Put simply, missives would do little in the face of missiles.

Granted, Asean can take comfort in America's "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific. As the historical guarantor of Asian security and prosperity, Washington could be counted on to provide a backstop against Chinese assertiveness.

But as my colleague Christian Le Miere writes in Survival, the rebalance remains modest, given domestic financial pressures in the US and continuing commitments in the Middle East. More importantly, it is not a given that the US would act on its alliance commitments to the Philippines and Japan - two countries involved in territorial disputes with China.

This is not to say that Asean is ineffective. In recent years, the 10-member grouping has facilitated the integration of Myanmar back into Asean. It has succeeded in getting China, Russia and the US to join the East Asia Summit - the pre-eminent institution in the region.

The ADMM-Plus staged a four-day humanitarian assistance disaster relief and military medicine exercise in June last year. It was a historic exercise that involved 3,000 troops from countries such as the US, China, Japan, India and Vietnam.

But the challenge for Asean is to further such cooperation in the area of "hard" security issues such as territorial disputes.

Asean lacks cohesion on the issue of the South China Sea, which involves four Asean members - the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam - and China.

This was clear in July 2012, when Asean failed to issue a communique due to differences over the South China Sea. Currently, only the Philippines has taken its dispute with China to an arbitral tribunal formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Other Asean states, such as Malaysia and Brunei, have taken a more low-key approach in their disputes with China. And the jury is still out as to whether Asean can finalise a Code of Conduct agreement with China on the South China Sea.

Asean could also do little if push came to shove in the Sino- Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The onus is on the US, and whether it would come to Japan's aid.

No wonder South-east Asian countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have started to develop their anti-access area denial capabilities to better counter the growing dominance of the People's Liberation Army navy in the South China Sea.

Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, while the Philippines has outlined plans to acquire new coastal cutters from the US Coast Guard, to be equipped with anti-ship missiles.

Therein lies the lesson from the Crimean episode: as in Europe, diplomacy, regional institutions and soft power are important in Asia. But when confronted with displays of hard power, the acquisition of hard power assets matters more.

In 1935, French foreign minister Pierre Laval suggested that the Soviet Union encourage Catholicism to propitiate the Pope. In reply, Josef Stalin said: "The Pope! How many divisions has he got?"

The Chinese approach to the use of force is similar. According to a Chinese slogan, guo jia zun yan shi da chu lai de (a country's sense of respect is derived from fighting). For many South-east Asian countries, this bears repeating.

Settle maritime claims through jaw-jaw

Apr 10, 2014

EDITORIAL

THE Philippines' decision to contest China's vast claims over the South China Sea was advanced when it recently submitted a formal plea before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Itlos). A 4,000-page, 10-volume memorial contains Manila's arguments, evidence and maps to support its case against China's nine-dash line, which encloses 90 per cent of the South China Sea. Those expansive claims have put Beijing at loggerheads with Manila and others who are determined to defend what they too believe to be legitimately theirs.

The Rise of an Insecure Giant

DEC 3, 2013

"...unwilling to accept American leadership in Asia... reluctant to assume a more prominent role..."

SHLOMO BEN-AMI

SEOUL – By the time China overtakes the United States as the world’s largest economy sometime in the next few years, it will have cemented its status as a major military power – one whose drive to assert itself strategically already is inspiring serious anxiety among its neighbors. But the truth is that China is a solitary, vulnerable rising power – one that faces potentially crippling domestic challenges.

China is currently encircled by US military installations and allies. While Asian countries are largely willing to maintain and even expand their economic ties with China, none (except North Korea, which depends on Chinese aid) is prepared to accept it as the region’s primary power. In fact, US allies like Indonesia and India have emerged as global players largely in response to China’s rise.

China likely to assert historical claims in maritime disputes, says Lee Kuan Yew

TODAY

March 29

SINGAPORE — A rising China will not allow its sea boundaries to be decided by external parties and will assert its position by claiming historical rights to disputed waters in the South China Sea, says former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew.

“It is naive to believe that a strong China will accept the conventional definition of what parts of the sea around it are under its jurisdiction,” wrote Mr Lee in an article in the April issue of Forbes magazine.