China has already faced difficulty enforcing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) it set up two years ago covering the islands disputed with Japan in the East China Sea, which is closer to the Chinese mainland. Setting up and maintaining a zone over the much larger South China Sea would be even harder.
“The South China Sea is a completely different beast,” said senior researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute in Beijing, Li Jie. “The territorial disputes there involve many more countries, and if you take out a map, the topographic features are much more complex. It’d be more provocative in the eyes of the Americans.”
Quiet air zone shows China’s struggle to control contested seas
OCTOBER 30, 2015
BEIJING — As the battle for control of the South China Sea heats up, Beijing’s struggle to assert its authority over another disputed waterway may prove instructive.
China has been warning planes away from reefs it reclaimed in the South China Sea, and has said it reserves the right to announce an air defence identification zone over the area. It is expected to boost its military presence after the United States this week sailed a warship into the 12-nautical-mile zone (about 19km) around China’s man-made islands.
But controlling the seas may prove easier for China than controlling the air, according to observers, even after the US incursion and with further patrols expected. The US warship did not venture far inside the 12-nautical-mile zone, where China’s coast guard is versed in providing a ring of deterrence.
China has already faced difficulty enforcing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) it set up two years ago covering the islands disputed with Japan in the East China Sea, which is closer to the Chinese mainland. Setting up and maintaining a zone over the much larger South China Sea would be even harder.
“The South China Sea is a completely different beast,” said senior researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute in Beijing, Li Jie. “The territorial disputes there involve many more countries, and if you take out a map, the topographic features are much more complex. It’d be more provocative in the eyes of the Americans.”
LACKING ENFORCEMENT
Since setting up the East China Sea air zone — through which the US swiftly flew B-52 bombers — China has quietly stopped seeking to actively enforce it, according to military officials and policy advisers who have followed the issue. That’s despite initial warnings the military might use force against planes that failed to follow rules, including the requirement to file flight plans.
The air zone is technically in operation in the sense China’s air force patrols it, but it has never taken “defensive emergency measures” set out in the initial announcement, which could include interceptions of planes.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lacks the ground-based air surveillance and a detailed joint operational plan between the air force and the navy to “fully and effectively” administer the entire zone, according to a former senior PLA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
There are also strategic considerations: If China were to intercept aircraft that didn’t follow its rules, it could potentially risk a clash with a country such as Japan, which has a well-trained, efficient air force, or the US. “It is my understanding that China has never sought to fully enforce the ADIZ as it pertains to military aircraft,” said Ms Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“This is partly a function of insufficient capability. It is also because China does not want a military confrontation with Japan.”
The initial announcement of the air zone brought some confusion. While the rules were supposed to apply to all aircraft entering the area, the defence ministry later said commercial flights by foreign airlines would not be affected.
Japan Airlines (JAL) and All Nippon Airways don’t report flight plans to China, and haven’t done so for almost two years. They only reported their plans for several days in the aftermath of the zone’s announcement. JAL is not aware of any issues related to the non-filing of such plans, said Tokyo-based spokesman Jian Yang.
The ADIZ could have been conducted “in a more mature manner”, said Professor Shen Dingli, associate dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. Beijing could have learned from the US, the first country to set up an air defence zone in 1950 over North America, Prof Shen said. The US carried out a three-month pilot programme beforehand.
The East China Sea zone only served to strengthen ties between Japan and the US. Visiting Japan in April last year, President Barack Obama said the islands were covered by the US-Japan security treaty and the US would oppose any attempt to undermine Japan’s control of them.
“This was a direct reaction to the Chinese announcement of the zone, and the Americans were effectively telling the Chinese: ‘Don’t do your zone, because I’m still No 1 in the region’,” said Prof Shen.
Similarly, in the South China Sea, the US might be compelled to assist another regional ally, the Philippines. Other South-east Asian nation claimants to the South China Sea, such as Vietnam, have drawn closer to the US in recent years.
While the Chinese military has made advances in building its naval force in the last decade, including rolling out its first aircraft carrier, it also suffers serious weaknesses, according to a Rand Corp report released earlier this year. The military has not fought a major war since a border fight with Vietnam in 1979.
That may not deter China given President Xi Jinping’s eagerness for the country to become a military power, something he has spoken of as a return to China’s natural state.
“The escalation in the South China Sea might be a blessing in disguise, and it can actually turn into a good thing,” said Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor at China’s National Defence University. “It would help boost solidarity in the military, adding an extra sense of urgency to put in more effort to strengthen the navy, and drive home the point that economic development is not enough if China wants to become a true power.”
BLOOMBERG
US directly drawn into South China Sea disputes
Richard Javad Heydarian
Political science professor at De La Salle University in the Philippines
30 Oct 2015
After months of intense preparations and weeks of extensive deliberations, the United States decided to effectively challenge China's sovereignty claims in the Spratly chain of islands by deploying a guided-missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, within the 12-nautical-mile radius of Chinese-occupied Subi Reef.
The United States has tried to justify its decision by invoking international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and the strategic necessity to preserve freedom of navigation across the contested waters.
The Obama administration's decision to deploy a destroyer rather than, say, less lethal patrol vessels was certainly meant to send a strong message that the US is committed to serving as an anchor of stability in Asia.
The decision has been warmly welcomed by US allies, who have anxiously opposed the prospects of Chinese domination in the South China Sea, a vital artery of global trade and energy transport.
Manila, which has requested US assistance to protect its supply lines in the area against Chinese harassment, was particularly pleased to see a more robust pushback against Beijing's maritime ambitions.
As expected, China lashed out at the US, vowing to "resolutely respond to any country's deliberate provocations".
True to its words, Beijing dispatched its own destroyers to escort the US vessel out of the immediate surroundings of the feature under its control.
Professing neutrality vis-à-vis claimant states' sovereignty claims in the area, the Obama administration has repeatedly reiterated that its actions are not targeted against any specific country.
It has promised to conduct these so-called "freedom of navigation" (FON) operations on a regular basis, also targeting features claimed by other claimant states such as Vietnam and the Philippines.
A closer look, however, suggests that China is the main target of the US' latest manoeuvre.
For the past two years, China has engaged in a frantic construction bonanza, reclaiming 1,170ha of land and artificially transforming low-tide elevations and rocks into full-fledged islands, some
of which are poised to host advanced airstrips and military facilities. China has built a 3km-long airstrip on the Fiery Cross, which is expected to serve as the command and control centre of Beijing's operations in the Spratlys.
Similar facilities are under construction in Subi and Mischief reefs. The US and its allies fear that China could leverage this sprawling network of facilities to impose its will and restrict freedom of navigation and overflight in the area.
By building lighthouses and other advanced facilities on previously submergible land features, China could also bolster and gradually gain international recognition for its sweeping territorial claims, well beyond its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf.
By deploying surveillance missions into the 12-nautical-mile radius of Chinese-held features, the Obama administration is effectively countering Beijing's sovereignty claims.
Land features such as the Subi and Mischief reefs are considered low-tide elevations, which are not entitled to their own maritime entitlement zones.
So quite ironically, the US, which has not ratified the Unclos, is using international maritime law to rein in China's (a signatory) ambitions in the area.
The US' FON operations, therefore, are also meant to prevent China from turning its sovereignty claims into fait accompli, as well as dissuade it from deploying advanced weaponries and military hardware to the features under its control.
More than ever, the US is now directly involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Its latest challenge against China carries both the promise of reining in China's assertiveness or, alternatively, intensifying tensions in the region and undermining prospects for a diplomatic management of the South China Sea spats.
What is clear, however, is that allies such as the Philippines, who are bereft of their own independent deterrence against China, are pleased to see the Obama administration more directly involved in the disputes.
The writer is a political science professor at De La Salle University in the Philippines.
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