Friday, December 31, 2021

Commentary: Joe Biden is missing the opportunity to reset 50-year progress in US-China relations

The US is no longer the world hegemon, but behaves as if it is in dealing with China, say Hong Kong observers.

United States President Joe Biden listens as he meets virtually with Chinese President Xi Jinping from the 
Roosevelt Room of the White House in Washington on Nov 15, 2021. (File photo: AP/Susan Walsh)

Andrew Sheng

Xiao Geng

30 Dec 2021

HONG KONG - Next year will mark 50 years since US President Richard Nixon travelled to China to meet with Communist Party of China Chairman Mao Zedong and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai - a major step toward restoring relations after decades of estrangement and hostility.

A half-century later, the progress they launched has been all but lost, and US President Joe Biden is partly to blame.

The ideological differences between the United States and China in 1972 could not have been starker. But both sides recognised the vast benefits of a d├ętente.
By isolating the Soviet Union, they hastened the end of the Cold War. And by enabling China to shift its focus to peaceful economic development, they bolstered global prosperity for decades to follow.

[And now, by (trying to) isolate China, the US is also trying to "end" China.]

Thanks to a large labour force and abundant land, China became a manufacturing powerhouse, enabling international firms to slash their production costs and deliver more affordable goods to consumers.

[Yes. The large labour force has given China a "demographic dividend". But now that "dividend" has become a liability in terms of an ageing, pensioning population that will draw down on resources in their silver years, and that will handicap the Chinese economy. Four decades of growth, and those people that helped in the 4 decades are now retiring, while their "one-child" policy has severely limited the number of young people that can replace that pioneer generation.]

Over time, Chinese incomes grew, and low-cost production began to move elsewhere. But China's economic progress - in particular, growing demand from its massive domestic market - has continued to benefit the rest of the world.

[The "massive domestic market" is a two-edged sword.]

In fact, as Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan have pointed out, the world owes the Great Moderation - the period of decreased macroeconomic volatility that lasted from the 1980s until 2007 - largely to China's integration into the global economy. The US reaped rich rewards from China's rise during this period.


But the US also made several strategic mistakes. The end of the Cold War gave the country an unprecedented opportunity to update the world order for an era defined by new challenges and rivalries.

But, as Richard Haass has lamented, it squandered that opportunity, instead dedicating itself - and US$8 trillion - to a War on Terror that was flawed in design and a failure in practice.

[True that. But irrelevant. Or at best tangentially "relevant". And if we're going to talk about shooting oneself in the foot with wasteful "wars", there's also the CCP''s (or XJP's) war on Big Tech (Jack Ma), property developers (Evergrande), celebrities, social media "influencers", and (IIRC) K-pop within the last two years... even as it was trying to manage a pandemic.]

Meanwhile, the US failed to adapt to a changing global economy. When millions of Americans lost manufacturing jobs, they blamed trade, especially with China, even though technology played a far bigger role.

[Again, true. But hindsight is 20/20. And what is relevant may not be politically pertinent. What I mean is, yes, the US should not blame trade when it was technology, but that fact was not politically pertinent. Maybe the politicians should have made it pertinent, or maybe the politicians are just as stupid, or they were just getting ahead of the crowd in order to "lead" them.]

Declining middle-class incomes and rising inequality exacerbated discontent.

The 2008 financial crisis sent these frustrations into overdrive.

Beyond highlighting the government's utter failure to keep the financial sector in check, the crisis showed that America's position atop the global economic pecking order was no longer unassailable.

Whereas the US triggered the crisis and suffered through a recession, China's growth never dipped below 6 per cent, and the country's massive 2009 stimulus package helped fuel the global recovery by driving up commodity prices.

[There are suggestions and even evidence that much of China's vaunted GDP growth was goosed up by questionable practices (such as building Ghost Cities), and creative accounting by regional government. But sure, the OFFICIAL figures for GDP growth has been 6% or higher. Actual GDP growth, tho...]

Donald Trump won the White House in 2016 by sensing - and then stoking - voters' growing fears and frustrations, and by portraying the loss of American primacy as an existential threat for which China was to blame.

But far from "making America great again," Trump eroded the country's global standing further by abandoning commitments, alienating allies, and failing to devise anything close to a coherent strategy for tackling shared challenges.

His counterproductive trade war with China is a case in point. Yet Trump was hardly alone in viewing China as a major threat that must be contained.

[As was China's counterproductive unilateral trade sanctions against Australia...]

That much has become clear under the Biden administration, which, despite reversing many of Trump's other policies, has maintained a hard line on China, and is even attempting to create a coalition of democracies to contain it.

After Trump's tumultuous four years in office, Biden had an opportunity to engineer a reset, engaging constructively with China, as well as with Russia, to figure out how to manage a multipolar world.

[In mental health, "bipolar" is a mental health issue. In geopolitics, is multipolarism a global health issue?    :-)]

Instead of seizing it, he has created the sense that countries may need to pick a side in the US-China rivalry. Given America's battered global reputation, Biden may well find that this approach does not produce an entirely favourable outcome.

Even European powers have struck a softer tone toward China - with which they maintain crucial economic ties - and have expressed a desire to avoid an overly militarised strategy.

[That seems like a selective reading of the news. There are some evidence that views of China has turned negative over the years. And if the populace is against China, how can political leaders show more favourable treatment to China?
"But China, in turn, is at risk of underestimating Europe. Even during these years of great difficulty for the EU, China has found it difficult to circumvent the complex of rules and convention that bind European states – and prospective EU members – together. Yet it still operates on a vision where Europe is a set of sovereign states with a regional organisation that happens to be the EU."
In other words, China does not "get" the EU or the nations in the EU or the values of the EU. So this "reading" of "European powers" softer tone, may be selective or wishful, rather than accurate.]


Whether the US likes it or not, a multipolar order is in many ways already here.

As recent studies by Harvard's Belfer Center show, China is rapidly catching up with the US in terms of technology and military capabilities, though the US still leads in finance, research and development, education, and access to global talent.

Moreover, unlike during the Cold War, the leading global powers - especially the US and China - are economic peers. As a 1988 RAND study showed, the Soviet Union's GDP peaked at 60 per cent of US GDP in 1977.

While the Soviet Union was spending 15-17 per cent of GDP on defence - three times the share in the US - its per capita income amounted to just half of America's.

[Proof by omission. And what is the per capita income of China? One figure is over $10,000, whilst the US is $63,000. If the Soviet Union was foolish to try to beat the US when its per capita income was just half of the US, how much more foolish for a China with just 1/6 (or 1/4 if using Purchasing Power Parity) of the US? To be fair, China spends 1.7% of its GDP on the Defence, whilst the US spends 3.73%. So less than half compared to the US (in terms of GDP)... Just out of interest, SG spends 3.3% of GDP on defence.]

By contrast, China and Russia together account for about 77 per cent of US GDP in current dollar terms and 137 per cent by purchasing power parity.

[Why do the writers need to lump Russia together with China? Are these two countries heading for an alliance (against the US)? Ignoring Russia, China's population is 4 times larger than the US. And the GDP exceeds the US? Yes, China has matched and exceeded the US GDP (if using Purchasing Power Parity), but China managed this feat while having 4 times the population of the US. Still impressive? That's like playing football where one side only has 3 or 4 players.] 

Furthermore, the US is weighed down by debt, which has swelled to US$29.2 trillion. At 122 per cent of GDP, America's debt-to-GDP ratio now exceeds its World War II peak of 119 per cent of GDP.

[Great. Now tell us how this is significant and important. The US is "weighed down by debt"? What exactly is the economic threat? Yes, it is a political threat (as in one political party uses the rising debt to obstruct the other when the other is in power, but when they are in power they hypocritically spend profligately, increasing debt, without concern.)  How does this debt affect the US economically?]

The nineteenth-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck observed that in a world order dominated by five states, it is always desirable to be part of a group of three.

As former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has pointed out, this implies that in a three-country order, one should want to be in the group of two.

Instead of isolating itself by alienating Russia and China, the US should engage with them as equals - most immediately to clarify sensitive issues relating to buffer lands and borders.

The US should understand well why Russia is so concerned about Ukraine joining NATO, and why China will not accept any declaration of independence by Taiwan or its militarisation by foreign powers.

The US was not going to tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, was it?

American hegemony is over. But a stable global balance of power is achievable. It is Biden's move.

Andrew Sheng, a distinguished fellow at the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong, is a member of the UNEP Advisory Council on Sustainable Finance. Xiao Geng, Chairman of the Hong Kong Institution for International Finance, is a professor and Director of the Institute of Policy and Practice at the Shenzhen Finance Institute at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. 


[Final word on the authors of this article. China's crackdown on dissent from HK has reduced the credibility and perceived independence of HK institutions and people. Knowing that dissent and dissenters could be arrested and prosecuted, any opinion from people or institutions in HK (that are in line with official CCP talking points) are going to be suspect. This article sounds very much like a pro-CCP/pro-China piece that is unmitigatedly critical of US (and specifically Biden's) China-related policies, while trumpeting the (questionable) achievements and manifest destiny of China. We should question that. The rise of China is NOT inevitable. ]

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