China seen as most influential power in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Studies Centre
But survey respondents from the 10 ASEAN states also expressed concern about the country's expanding influence. |
| Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index 2023: (from first to tenth place) United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand. |
13 Feb 2023
SINGAPORE: China is seen as the most influential economic and political power in Southeast Asia, but its expanding influence is not viewed favourably by a majority of respondents in a survey of Southeast Asians.
The latest State of Southeast Asia survey report, published by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, found that China is viewed as the most influential economic power, by nearly 60 per cent of respondents.
But this is significantly lower than the percentage of 76.7 per cent in 2022, and the decline followed strict mobility restrictions in China due to COVID-19.
China is also seen as the most influential political-strategic power in the region (41.5 per cent), but the perception of its influence has also fallen from 54.4 per cent last year.
That said, China’s growing influence is "not well-received by the region", as a majority of those who view China as the most influential country in the region expressed concern about its expanding influence, said the report published on Feb 9.
[News Media can be... "deceptive". Two "factual" points - 1) China is viewed as the most influential economic power "by nearly 60% of respondents" in the latest survey. This is down from 76.7% in 2022.
2) China is also seen as "most influential" power by 41.5%. Down from 54.4% previously.
BUT the "conclusion" is "China's growing influence"???? I see they have an oppositional understanding of "growing influence"... Or the commentary has a conclusion, and the "facts" don't matter.
 |
| State of SEA 2023, ISEAS report |
]
But the extent of wariness has declined over the past two years, decreasing from 86.5 per cent in 2021 and 76.4 per cent in 2022 to 68.5 per cent.
The survey found that Brunei (94.4 per cent), followed by Cambodia (47.4 per cent) showed the greatest acceptance of China’s influence.
Still, if ASEAN were forced to choose between the two major powers - China or the United States, two-thirds of respondents or 61 per cent will cast their lot with the US, the report said.
China as a choice dropped from 43 per cent last year to 38.9 per cent in 2023, while the US has gained more support, having risen in popularity from 57 per cent.
But this was not true across all 10 ASEAN states, the majority of respondents from Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia favoured China over the US. The other states favoured the US, with the Philippines and Vietnam having the highest percentage of support for the US over China.
[
In 2022, countries strongly aligned to China are Cambodia (81.5%), and Laos (81.8%). Their "support" dropped to 26.9% and 41.1% respectively. For the US, in 2022, Myanmar was their greatest supporter (92%), dropping to 67.8% in 2023. Philippines also saw their "support" for the US drop from 83.5% to 78.8% (small dip). Singapore's "support" for China actually grew from 22.1% to 38.9% (almost doubled!) while SG's support for the US dropped from 77.9% to 61.1%.]
Meanwhile, Japan remains the most trusted major power among respondents with an overall "trust level" of 54.5 per cent. The main reason for this trust is that Japan is seen as a "responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law".
However, sceptics held the view that the country "is consumed with its internal affairs and relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours, and thus cannot focus on global concerns".
When asked about their top concerns about ASEAN, Southeast Asians remain most concerned about the regional bloc being "slow and ineffective".
A large majority (82.6 per cent) felt it was not able to cope with political and economic developments, a "drastic" 12.5 percentage point jump from 70.1 per cent in 2022, the report said.
This was felt most strongly by Vietnam respondents at 93.4 per cent, followed by Singapore at 89.9 per cent.
Many of the respondents (73 per cent) were also concerned that ASEAN is becoming an arena for major power competition, in which its member states may become proxies of major powers. About two-thirds (60.7 per cent) were worried about ASEAN’s disunity.
This may be related to a few issues that have tested ASEAN unity, the report said. ASEAN countries adopted different positions on the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, while there was a lack of unified response to the Myanmar crisis sparked by a 2021 coup.
MIXED VIEWS ON MYANMAR CRISIS
Two years since the coup, Myanmar remains in a state of paralysis and ASEAN respondents appear to hold mixed views about the problem, according to the survey.
When asked how the Myanmar issue should be moved forward, slightly more than a third of regional respondents (38.1 per cent) want ASEAN to engage in independent dialogue with all key stakeholders, including with the shadow National Unity Government, which was ousted in the coup, to build trust.
Another 18 per cent want to see ASEAN use harder methods such as suspension and targeted sanctions to increase the costs of non-compliance for Myanmar's ruling junta.
Among this group, Indonesia respondents expressed the strongest view at 24 per cent.
But views have shifted, with more saying that ASEAN should stay out of Myanmar’s domestic politics at 15.2 per cent, as opposed to 8.4 per cent last year.
This option is tied at third place with a desire to see greater coordinated international action, which has declined after the United Nations could not pass any meaningful resolution on the situation in Myanmar.
The least favoured option remains the expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN, but more are in favour, having grown to 13.7 per cent from 9.8 per cent in 2022.
The survey also found that Southeast Asia has moved beyond the health concerns of the COVID-19 pandemic, naming unemployment and economic recession (59.5 per cent), the impact of climate change (57.1 per cent) as the region’s most pressing challenges.
Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity, as well as military tensions, tied third at 41.9 per cent.
A total of 1,308 Southeast Asians were polled among members of the academia, business community, civil society, government officials, and personnel from regional or international organisations.
[This is a rather small sample size. 1308 from 10 countries means on average there were about 130 respondents (208 from Singapore) from each country. 130 people may not represent the views of the country. But eventually, this is just an opinion survey. So does it matter?]
A 10 per cent weighting average was applied to each country’s responses to calculate the average figures for ASEAN as a whole.
A 10 per cent weighting average was applied to each country’s responses to calculate the average figures for ASEAN as a whole.
Source: CNA/hm(sn)
Commentary: Southeast Asia has big concerns but limited choices in case of a Taiwan conflict
In the event of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, Southeast Asian countries will face a difficult dilemma and ASEAN’s latitude for manoeuvre will be limited, say these writers. |
| A Taiwan Coast Guard ship travels past the coast of China, in the waters off Nangan island of Matsu archipelago in Taiwan on Aug 16, 2022. (Photo: Reuters/Ann Wang) |
William Choong
Hoang Thi Ha
23 Feb 2023
SINGAPORE: The latest clash between China and the United States over purported Chinese surveillance balloons in American skies has again raised tensions in the world’s most consequential relationship. This only underscores the fragility of the uneasy peace in the Taiwan Strait, one of the region’s flashpoints.
The 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey sheds light on the dilemmas that Southeast Asian countries would face in the event of a conflict in the Strait.
Southeast Asians are acutely aware that they cannot be insulated from the fallout of a Taiwan conflict. The majority fear that such a conflict will destabilise the region (43.3 per cent) and force their countries to take sides (28.7 per cent).
Compared to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the stakes over Taiwan are much higher for Southeast Asia. There are more than 700,000 Southeast Asian migrant workers on the island. Taiwan is deeply integrated into regional supply chains, is a chipmaking giant, and straddles strategic lines of transport and communication. Any cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan (and the US) would derail economic growth and imperil regional stability.
Yet, the latitude for Southeast Asian countries’ response to a Taiwan conflict is limited. Many analysts have assessed that, given their deference to China’s core interests on the Taiwan issue, most Southeast Asian countries will try to stay neutral.
NEUTRALITY AND NON-USE OF FORCE
According to the survey, 33.5 per cent of Southeast Asian respondents will choose neutrality if conflict breaks out in the Strait. This is the top-ranked option for respondents from Brunei, Cambodia and Laos - three countries that have increasingly fallen into the Chinese orbit economically and geopolitically.
The top-ranked response across all Southeast Asian countries is “Opposing the use of force through diplomatic measures” (45.6 per cent). A majority of respondents from Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand chose this option.
It should be noted that “Adopting a neutral position” and “Opposing the use of force” are not necessarily mutually exclusive in practice. The former connotes a reactive and passive stance, while the latter is more proactive and is based on the principle of the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Of note, the option “Showing support for China” garnered the fewest votes, at only 2.7 per cent across the region. More respondents from Cambodia (9 per cent) and Laos (6.5 per cent) chose this option but even their numbers remain surprisingly low.
China will not welcome this, as it demonstrates little appetite among Southeast Asians to see China achieve its re-unification with Taiwan through forceful means. Although all Southeast Asian countries embrace the so-called One-China policy and recognise that the People’s Republic of China is the sole representative of China, this does not necessarily mean they agree to China’s use of force to take back Taiwan.
Their official statements reflect a range of degrees of acceptance: Singapore is “opposed to any unilateral moves to change the status quo” while Cambodia “resolutely supports China’s every effort to achieve national re-unification”. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) collective position is a preference for peaceful settlement, as reflected in the ASEAN foreign ministers’ statement in August 2022.
PHILIPPINES, THE MOST LIKELY OUTLIER IN ASEAN
The survey points to the Philippines as the most likely outlier in a Taiwan contingency. Twenty-two per cent of Philippine respondents chose the option “Facilitate military support for Taiwan”.
This percentage ranks highest among all ASEAN countries, well above the regional average of 6.3 per cent. However, this is still lower than more than 54 per cent of Philippine respondents who chose “Opposing the use of force through diplomatic means”.
It appears that the Marcos Jr administration has run ahead of Philippine respondents’ majority views. On Feb 2, Manila gave the US access to four new bases on top of the existing five under their 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The EDCA allows for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment, and building of facilities like runways.
Manila’s involvement in any cross-strait conflict would be critical: Its northernmost island of Luzon lies just 200km from Taiwan. The EDCA bases could host missile and artillery systems and highly mobile US Marine Corps units, all of which could be deployed to counter an invasion of Taiwan.
The Philippine ambassador to Washington DC has said that Manila is granting access for its “own security”. The Bashi Channel sits astride Taiwan and the Philippines, and serves as a key transit route between the East China and South China Seas.
To the Chinese, control of this waterway would help to deter US forces from operating out of the Philippines. As President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said recently, “Should there in fact be conflict in that area… it’s very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved”.
Manila’s decision to facilitate US access in a Taiwan contingency would put significant pressure on Singapore, a close US defence and security partner. Singapore hosts the US Navy’s Logistics Group Western Pacific, which provides logistics and sustainment to the Seventh Fleet.
Singapore may have to consider whether to grant access to US forces headed to the Strait if hostilities break out between China and Taiwan. While not doing so may seriously rupture Singapore’s longstanding bilateral relationship with Washington, granting access could be a divisive domestic issue while angering Beijing.
The survey points to the Philippines as the most likely outlier in a Taiwan contingency. Twenty-two per cent of Philippine respondents chose the option “Facilitate military support for Taiwan”.
This percentage ranks highest among all ASEAN countries, well above the regional average of 6.3 per cent. However, this is still lower than more than 54 per cent of Philippine respondents who chose “Opposing the use of force through diplomatic means”.
It appears that the Marcos Jr administration has run ahead of Philippine respondents’ majority views. On Feb 2, Manila gave the US access to four new bases on top of the existing five under their 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The EDCA allows for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment, and building of facilities like runways.
Manila’s involvement in any cross-strait conflict would be critical: Its northernmost island of Luzon lies just 200km from Taiwan. The EDCA bases could host missile and artillery systems and highly mobile US Marine Corps units, all of which could be deployed to counter an invasion of Taiwan.
The Philippine ambassador to Washington DC has said that Manila is granting access for its “own security”. The Bashi Channel sits astride Taiwan and the Philippines, and serves as a key transit route between the East China and South China Seas.
To the Chinese, control of this waterway would help to deter US forces from operating out of the Philippines. As President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said recently, “Should there in fact be conflict in that area… it’s very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved”.
Manila’s decision to facilitate US access in a Taiwan contingency would put significant pressure on Singapore, a close US defence and security partner. Singapore hosts the US Navy’s Logistics Group Western Pacific, which provides logistics and sustainment to the Seventh Fleet.
Singapore may have to consider whether to grant access to US forces headed to the Strait if hostilities break out between China and Taiwan. While not doing so may seriously rupture Singapore’s longstanding bilateral relationship with Washington, granting access could be a divisive domestic issue while angering Beijing.
START THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE
The increased tensions over the Taiwan Strait over the past year have forced more Southeast Asians in the foreign policy-security establishment to start thinking the unthinkable and to stop seeing a Strait contingency from a parochial mindset.
Understandably, most do not want to see an armed conflict occur and, if it does, to be drawn into its vortex. But both outcomes may not be within their control.
At the least, the Philippines’ charging ahead into a tighter alliance with the US would make it difficult for ASEAN to reach any consensus on how to respond collectively in a Taiwan contingency. This issue is going to be deeply divisive within ASEAN.
William Choong is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Managing Editor at Fulcrum. Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog Fulcrum.
The increased tensions over the Taiwan Strait over the past year have forced more Southeast Asians in the foreign policy-security establishment to start thinking the unthinkable and to stop seeing a Strait contingency from a parochial mindset.
Understandably, most do not want to see an armed conflict occur and, if it does, to be drawn into its vortex. But both outcomes may not be within their control.
At the least, the Philippines’ charging ahead into a tighter alliance with the US would make it difficult for ASEAN to reach any consensus on how to respond collectively in a Taiwan contingency. This issue is going to be deeply divisive within ASEAN.
William Choong is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Managing Editor at Fulcrum. Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog Fulcrum.
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